non paying and slow paying customers

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technoman
Head Tech
Posts: 62
Joined: Mon Aug 07, 2006 11:29 am

non paying and slow paying customers

Post by technoman » Sat Oct 04, 2014 6:50 am

Do you think PEI should have a page where we can put non-paying customers and slow paying customers. And we can use it like our own credit report?
Keep it simple the more Complex it is the more expensive and harder to understand and guess what you get the same result. :ugeek: :ugeek: :ugeek: :ugeek:

JohnnyBravo
Pump Jockey
Posts: 6
Joined: Thu Jun 09, 2011 8:32 am

non paying and slow paying customers

Post by JohnnyBravo » Tue Oct 21, 2014 10:40 am

Well no since PEI strives to be neutral as far as hosting, writing or encouraging anything that would be negative or too-positive about any one company or product.



You'd have to seek external resources like the BBB to bemoan a company.



From the company's perspective, it would be libel or an accusation against them and PEI would be seen as encouraging it. All kinds of legal entanglements ensue.

Samir
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Posts: 326
Joined: Fri Jun 27, 2014 8:25 am
Location: HSV

non paying and slow paying customers

Post by Samir » Fri Nov 14, 2014 1:32 am

What is interesting is that the retail industry has a similar internal 'lookup' system for potential employees. A lot of employee retail theft doesn't get prosecuted, so the retail industry keeps their own database that members can access. I believe it has been challenged in court and was deemed legal. I bet PEI could do something similar for their memebers.
Not a technician even though it says 'Head Tech'. :?

ZMiller
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Joined: Sun Jul 15, 2007 10:53 am
Location: Atlanta/Phoenix/Sacramento

non paying and slow paying customers

Post by ZMiller » Fri Nov 14, 2014 1:47 am

Many may not believe this but not so many years ago being a service station attendant was a chosen profession. There was a union for gas station attendants. You had to be in the union if you wanted to be hired to pump gas. If you had had issues related to your character or honesty you lost your union card and didn't work in the profession any longer.



“An owner, operator or employee of a filling station service station, garage, or other dispensary where class 1 flammable liquids are dispensed at retail may not permit any person other than the owner, operator or employee to use or manipulate any pump, hose, pipe or other device for dispensing the liquids into the fuel tank of a motor vehicle or other retail container.”



ORS 480.385, Civil penalty for dispensing law violation:

Civil penalty shall become due and payable 10 days after order: up to $500.
When you are dead it's likely you won't know it. It could be difficult for others. It's the same if you are stupid.
"Tact is the ability to tell someone to go to Hell in a way that they will begin looking forward to the trip"

ZMiller
Head Tech
Posts: 1016
Joined: Sun Jul 15, 2007 10:53 am
Location: Atlanta/Phoenix/Sacramento

non paying and slow paying customers

Post by ZMiller » Fri Nov 14, 2014 2:18 am

Diesel you might want to take a few seconds and read the following.



The following text is how one would go about laying off or firing a union represented service station attendant.

Prior to January 1981, one of the stations was fully automated

while the other was a self-service station with lane attendants who

collected cash from customers.

Case No. 8-CO-38



DECISION AND ORDER



The Administrative Law Judge issued the attached Decision in the

above-entitled consolidated proceeding, finding that the Respondent had

engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaints, and

recommending that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take

certain affirmative action. The Respondent and the General Counsel

filed exceptions to the Judge's Decision.



Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Authority's Rules and Regulations

and section 7118 of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations

Statute (the Statute), the Authority has reviewed the rulings of the

Judge made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was

committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. Upon consideration of the

Judge's Decision and the entire record, the Authority hereby adopts the

Judge's findings, conclusions and recommendations as modified herein.



With regard to the appropriate remedy for the violations found in

Case No. 8-CO-37, the Authority agrees with the Judge that it is not

material that the Union may have decided that the grievances or

statutory appeals at issue were lacking in merit, as the Union had

interjected itself into the grievance process, and had refused to assist

the employees only because of their non-member status. At the same

time, we also agree with the Judge, in the circumstances of this case,

that a backpay remedy is not warranted, noting particularly the Judge's

conclusion that "the weight of the evidence does not indicate that

intervention by the Union would have resulted in the substantive relief

sought by the grievant." Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424 U.S. 554, 91

LRRM 2481 (1976). We do not agree, however, that the Union should pay

for "legal representation, of the employees' choice." The facts of this

case do not in our view warrant, and no party seeks, such an order.

Rather, we will order that the Union provide representation, by its own

or outside legal counsel if appropriate, to the employees if they choose

to seek a waiver of time limits under either the negotiated grievance

procedure or any statutory appeals procedures available to them to now

file grievances or appeals.



With regard to Case No. 8-CO-38, the Authority agrees with the

Judge's conclusion that the Union violated section 7131(b) of the

Statute. While the solicitation in this case was undertaken by a person

who was a full-time Union representative and not an employee within the

meaning of the Statute, the record reveals that the Union representative

specifically had requested duty time from management for four employees,

resulting in overtime payments for two, to discuss the employees'

concerns with their conditions of employment, and the Union

representative used this time for another purpose, the solicitation of

Union membership. In this regard, the Statute requires that "any

activities" by an employee relating to internal union business,

"including the solicitation of membership," be on nonduty time. /1/ The

requirement applies to an employee's use of duty time and, as here,

whenever a Union representative meets with employees on their duty time

for such purposes. /2/ Since the Union knowingly violated the spirit

and letter of section 7131(b), the Authority concludes, in agreement

with the Judge, that the Union thereby violated section 7116(b)(1) and

(8) of the Statute.



ORDER



Pursuant to section 2423.29 of the Federal Labor Relations

Authority's Rules and Regulations and section 7118 of the Statute, it is

hereby ordered that the Service Employees International Union, Local

556, AFL-CIO, shall:



1. Cease and desist from:



(a) Conditioning representation under the parties' collective

bargaining agreement of non-members on their joining the Service

Employees International Union, Local 556, AFL-CIO.



(b) Telling employees in the bargaining unit that it will not process

grievances pursuant to the contractual grievance procedure because of

their non-membership in the Union.



(c) Refusing to process grievances of bargaining unit employees

because they are not members of the Service Employees International

Union, Local 556, AFL-CIO.



(d) Soliciting Union membership on employees' duty time.



(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or

coercing any employee in the exercise of the rights assured them by the

Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.



2. Take the following affirmative action in order to effectuate the

purposes and policies of the Statute:



(a) Represent the interests of all employees in the bargaining unit

without regard to Union membership.



(b) Upon request, provide employees Patsy K. Paige, Miriam Gutowski,

Marcela Santiago and Earl Kamanu with Union representation, by its own

or outside legal counsel if appropriate, to allow them to seek a waiver

of time limits either under the negotiated grievance procedure or

applicable statutory appeals procedures, so that they might seek to

process their grievances or file statutory appeals, and provide them

whatever services the Union would have provided in this matter had it

not acted discriminatorily.



(c) Post at its business offices and its normal meeting places,

including all places where notices to members, and to employees of the

Navy Exchange, Pearl, United States Naval Base, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii,

are customarily posted, copies of the attached Notice on forms to be

furnished by the Federal Labor Relations Authority. Upon receipt of

such forms, they shall be signed by the President of the Service

Employees International Union, Local 556, AFL-CIO, or his designee, and

they shall be posted and maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter,

in conspicuous places, including bulletin boards and all other places

where Union notices to members and unit employees are customarily

posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that such Notices are

not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.



(d) Pursuant to section 2423.30 of the Authority's Rules and

Regulations, notify the Regional Director, Region VIII, Federal Labor

Relations Authority, in writing, within 30 days from the date of this

Order, as to what steps have been taken to comply herewith.



Issued, Washington, D.C., May 8, 1985



Henry B. Frazier III, Acting

Chairman

William J. McGinnis, Jr., Member

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY









NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS AND OTHER EMPLOYEES



PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR

RELATIONS

AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF CHAPTER 71

OF TITLE

5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT

RELATIONS

WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR MEMBERS AND OTHER EMPLOYEES THAT:



WE WILL NOT condition representation under the parties' collective

bargaining agreement of non-members on their joining the Service

Employees International Union, Local 556, AFL-CIO. WE WILL NOT tell

employees in the bargaining unit that the Service Employees

International Union, Local 558, AFL-CIO, will not process grievances

pursuant to the contractual grievance procedure because of their

non-membership in the Union. WE WILL NOT refuse to process grievances

of bargaining unit employees because they are not members of the Service

Employees International Union, Local 556, AFL-CIO. WE WILL NOT solicit

Union membership on employees' duty time. WE WILL NOT, in any like or

related manner, interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee in the

exercise of the rights assured them by the Federal Service

Labor-Management Relations Statute. WE WILL represent the interests of

all employees in the bargaining unit without discrimination and without

regard to Union membership. WE WILL, upon request, provide employees

Patsy K. Paige, Miriam Gutowski, Marcela Santiago and Earl Kamanu with

representation, by our own or outside legal counsel if appropriate, to

allow them to seek a waiver of time limits, either under the negotiated

grievance procedure or applicable statutory appeals procedures, so that

they may seek to process their grievances or file statutory appeals, and

provide them whatever services the Union would have provided in this

matter had it not acted discriminatorily.

(Labor Organization)



Dated: . . . By: (Signature) (Title) This Notice must remain posted

for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be

altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. If employees have

any questions concerning this Notice or compliance with its provisions,

they may communicate directly with the Regional Director of the Federal

Labor Relations Authority, Region VIII, whose address is: 350 South

Figueroa Street, 10th Floor, Los Angeles, California 90071, and whose

telephone number is: (213) 688-3805.



















-------------------- ALJ$ DECISION FOLLOWS --------------------



E. A. Jones, Esq.

For the General Counsel



Eric A. Seitz, Esq.

For the Respondent



Robert F. Griem, Esq.

For the Activity



Before: ELI NASH, JR., Administrative Law Judge



DECISION



Statement of the Case



This case arose pursuant to the Federal Service Labor-Management

Relations Statute, 92 Stat. 1191, 5 U.S.C. 7101 et seq. (hereinafter

called the Statute), as a result of an unfair labor practice

Consolidated Complaint and Notice of Hearing issued May 12, 1981 by the

Regional Director, Region 8, Federal Labor Relations Authority, Los

Angeles, California.



The Consolidated Complaint alleges that Service Employees

International Union (hereinafter called the Union) violated section

7116(b)(1) and (8) of the Federal Labor Management Relations Statute

(hereinafter called the Statute) by telling certain employees that the

Union would not represent them in connection with their

reduction-in-force unless they joined the Union; by telling employees

that it had been instructed that employees could not file a grievance

until they joined the Union; by not filing a grievance on behalf of the

involved employees; and, by soliciting employees to join the Union

while they were on duty status. Respondent's Answer denied the

commission of any unfair labor practices.



A hearing was held in this matter before the undersigned in Honolulu,

Hawaii. All parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to

examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing

on the issues involved herein. All parties submitted timely briefs

which have been duly considered.



Upon the basis of the entire record, including my observation of the

witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following findings of fact and

conclusions.



Findings of Fact



The Activity operates two gas stations at the Pearl Harbor Naval

Base. Prior to January 1981, one of the stations was fully automated

while the other was a self-service station with lane attendants who

collected cash from customers. The self-service station employed four

employees in the NA-2/3 Mobile Equipment Services job classification.

They were Patsy K. Paige, Miriam Gutowski, Marcela Santiago and Earl

Kamanu.



In December 1980, the Activity automated the self-service station.

Since the automated station did not involve either servicing cars or

collecting cash in the lanes, the Activity decided that it no longer

needed employees in the Mobile Equipment Service classification, the

positions occupied by Paige, Gutowski, Santiago and Kamanu. Instead,

the Activity decided that it would operate the newly automated station

with a lower paying classification, PS-2 checker/cashier, thus requiring

a reorganization and reduction-in-force.



After making its decision to reorganize and conduct a

reduction-in-force, the Activity, as is required by the collective

bargaining agreement, Article 19, notified the Union by letter of its

intention to conduct a reorganization. /3/ Union vice president Gregory

Elliot acknowledged receipt of this notification. Elliot testified that

he was contacted in early January 1981 about the reduction-in-force in

the gas station, and that he then contacted Exchange Manager Gantz with

a request to negotiate on the retention of credits, an area which the

parties had not successfully resolved since 1979.



As provided in Article 19, Section 5 of the collective bargaining

agreement, the four affected employees were notified, following the

notification to the Union, on January 19, 1981, by a General

Reduction-In-Force Notice, that each could be subject to a

reduction-in-force by virtue of the reorganization of the self-service

station. The General Reduction-In-Force Notice stated that the proposed

action was being taken because of "a reorganization of the Service

Station due to conversion to fully automated gas lanes". Each employee

was given the general notice in the presence of a Union shop steward.

The notice also stated that the employee could be terminated, but

advised that each would receive a specific notice at least five calendar

days prior to termination, and that at that time each would be advised

of his or her job and appeal rights.



Following receipt of the general reduction-in-force notices the

affected employees Paige, Gutowski, Santiago and Kamanu, along with a

secretary, Sharon Smith and Union business representative Debbie Page

/4/ and shop steward Robert Goroza met with Exchange Manager Gantz, Gas

Station Manager Chun and a gas station supervisor, Linda Long on January

21, 1981. This meeting was apparently called to discuss the general

reduction-in-force notices of January 19, 1981. It is not clear whether

the Union attended this meeting to assist these employees, since Article

19 of the collective bargaining agreement provides that the Union will

provide assistance in communicating reasons for a reduction-in-force to

affected employees. What is clear is that the Union, before the meeting

ended, assumed a representational role. Exchange Manager Gantz

initially explained why the reduction-in-force was necessary and assured

the affected employees that they would have first consideration for

filling the new full-time PS-2 checker/cashier jobs at the automated

station. Sharon Smith, who was unaffected by the reorganization,

attempted to ask questions on behalf of the four employees. However,

Union business representative Page inquired whether the employees wanted

Smith or the Union to represent them concerning the reduction-in-force.

Since the employees selected the Union, Smith was required by business

representative Page to leave the meeting prior to its ending.



At the conclusion of the meeting, business representative Page

requested and received permission to meet alone with the four employees

and Union steward Goroza. After Activity representatives had departed,

Page, according to the four employees, stated that assisting them would

require "a lot of time after hours and on weekends to research" other

avenues that might be taken to help the employees. Business

representative Page then told the four employees that if they wanted her

to help them, one of them would have to join or "rejoin" the Union.

Page added that they would have five days to join the Union and that

they could get the necessary papers from steward Goroza. In response to

a question concerning the cost of membership Page informed them that new

members paid $15.00 while renewing membership cost $50.00.



Supervisor Long's testimony corroborates that a fee was mentioned for

Union membership during the meeting. Long stated that, after the

meeting, she overheard a heated argument involving the four employees,

Sharon Smith, and steward Goroza concerning what had happened in the

meeting with Page. According to Long, she overheard them arguing over

the $50.00 they were told they would have to pay for the Union to

represent them. She also overheard someone say that the contract was

supposed to cover them up to arbitration. Long broke up this gathering

and told the employees to follow the proper procedures if they wanted to

talk to Goroza.



Union business representative Page's recollection of the meeting

differs. According to Page, she explained to the employees that the

reduction-in-force procedures had to be followed and that, if they were,

it would take a lot more investigating to look into the matter. Page

further states that she told employees that the Union would be looking

into the reasons behind the reorganization, that the question had

already been raised in the Union office, and that a Union vice president

was looking into it. As already stated, vice president Elliot's

testimony confirms the Union's awareness of the proposed

reduction-in-force. Page testified that she told the employees that if

they wanted the Union to represent them, they would have to fill out a

representation form and that they had five days to fill out this form.

Page also testified that a gentleman inquired if the employees had to be

members of the Union for the forms to be processed, but recalls only

that she probably responded, "(T)he Union strives on membership and we

will be more than happy to have (you) become members." In conjunction

with this question, Page also recalls the mention of fees for joining

and rejoining the Union.



Union business representative Page further testified that, prior to

processing a case, the Union representative or first line shop steward

must have a letter of representation which is signed authorizing the

Union to proceed. This letter of representation is required of members

and nonmembers alike. There is no indication from the record that the

employees confused this letter of representation with an authorization

to join the Union.



Business representative Page also testified that at the time of the

January 21, 1981, meeting she felt a grievance could not be filed

although she did not explain this to the employees. Clearly, Page did

not inform these employees that the matter could not be handled under a

statutory appeals procedure, or that it could not be handled under the

negotiated grievance procedure as is raised by vice president Elliot in

his later testimony. Page states that she told the employees that the

Union had seven days to appeal or take action on the General

Reduction-In-Force Notice of January 19, 1981-- leaving five days to

sign a representation form, but later admitted that there was no

pressing need on January 21, 1981, for signatures on authorization forms

within five days. Her statement apparently left the four employees with

the notion that this was a matter which could be handled under the

grievance machinery and further confused the issue. In addition, Page

admitted that the contract does not require a signature on an

authorization form as a prerequisite to filing a grievance. Page also

acknowledged that the contract permits grievances on any employee

employment-related dissatisfaction.



A review of the collective bargaining agreement does not disclose

whether a reduction-in-force is or is not subject to the grievance

procedure of Article 28. Further, grade and pay retention matters

resulting from a reduction-in-force are normally appealable to the

Office of Personnel Management under a statutory appeals procedure

rather than through the grievance machinery. However, certain matters

relating to reductions in force may be handled under the grievance

machinery, as is pointed out later.



The meeting between Page and the four employees lasted about 15

minutes, and although Gutowski and Santiago had clocked out prior to the

meeting, employees Paige and Kamanu were on the clock throughout both

meeting with Activity and Union representatives. Since Paige and Kamanu

were on the clock during these meetings, business representative Page

spoke with supervisor Long after the meetings, telling her that the two

employees should be paid overtime for the meetings. During the meeting

with the employees, business representative Page also told employees

Paige and Kamanu that she would make sure that they were paid for the

time spent in the meetings that afternoon, and they were indeed paid

overtime for the meetings.



Based on the credited testimony of the four affected employees, which

is partially corroborated by the testimony of supervisor Long, it is

found that Union business representative Page told these employees that

if they wanted the Union to help them concerning the reduction-in-force

they would have to join or rejoin the Union, and that the cost,

depending on whether they joined or rejoined, would be either $15.00 or

$50.00. It is also found, that the record establishes that Union

business representative Page solicited membership of these employees

while they were on the clock.



Later on the afternoon of January 21, 1981, Paige went to supervisor

Long to inquire about filing a grievance. Long simply instructed Paige

to follow the contract procedures. Paige then went to Union steward

Goroza, and obtained from him a blank grievance form. As noted below,

the contract procedure would indeed allow Paige to process any grievance

without Union intervention.



Thereafter, Paige talked to her three fellow employees about filing a

grievance for the group. In addition, the four employees conferred and

agreed to each chip in enough money for Kamanu to join the Union since

business representative Page had said she would represent them if one of

them was in the Union. Kamanu testified that he found out about the

grievance after it had been turned down by the Union. Later, when he

learned that the Union was not going to help them, Kamanu told the other

three that there was no sense in joining. For whatever reasons, none of

the employees joined the Union.



Paige then drafted a grievance dated January 22, 1981 based on the

January 21, 1981 meeting with Exchange Manager Gantz. The nature of the

grievance was described as, "company is planning on adding more

employees, which will be doing the same work at less pay. Also Mr.

Gantz has no answers to our questions. But wants us to take a $1.14

drop in pay." Paige's grievance requested the following corrective

action: "If I am doing the same work, I want the same pay." In essence,

the grievance involved grade and salary retention, and as already noted,

there is a serious question whether that aspect could have been

processed under the grievance machinery.



Paige then tried unsuccessfully to contact business representative

Page. Failing this, Paige requested shop steward Goroza to submit the

grievance to business representative Page for her. Goroza took the

grievance and said he would try to reach Page. However, Goroza

apparently did not talk to Page, but instead took the grievance to chief

steward Lynn Mata who told him she could not take it because the

employees had not joined the Union. Goroza returned the grievance to

Paige and told her what Mata had said.



Supervisor Long corroborates Paige, testifying that she overheard

Paige and Goroza arguing about what Mata had said-- that since none of

them joined the Union, they were not going to be represented by the

Union. Since this incident occurred at the gas station, Long asked

Goroza what was going on. Goroza responded that he had just returned

from Mata who had instructed him to return the grievance to Paige

because the four employees had not joined the Union and paid the fees.

Long then instructed the employees to return to work.



Based on the foregoing, it is found that chief steward Mata did in

fact refuse to process the Paige grievance because none of the affected

employees were Union members and that the employees were told that their

lack of membership was the reason their grievance could not be

processed.



The grievance form also states that it was submitted to a "Manager"

on January 23, 1981. However, there is no record evidence that it was

ever received or processed by any Activity official. In fact, Gantz on

recross examination concedes that, "nothing had happened to these

employees at that point so I don't see how they could have filed an

appeal." 5 C.F.R. 351.901 permits appeals by "(a)n employee who has been

affected by a reduction in force action" to the Merit Systems Protection

Board. However, there is no indication that these employees were ever

informed of any appeal rights.



The collective bargaining agreement provides in Section 7 of Article

28 that an employee may present a grievance without intervention by the

Union. /5/ If indeed the grievance had been presented to a management

official, as the grievance form suggests, it should have been processed

without Union assistance. While this may be true, it is found that even

if management did not process the grievance, the Union would not be

relieved of its responsibility to represent these employees,

particularly since it initially sought to represent them and its reason

for not doing so was that these employees were not Union members.



Subsequently, Paige informed the other three employees of the Union's

refusal to accept the grievance. Paige also inquired of supervisor Long

what other options were available since the Union had refused to assist

because they had not joined. Supervisor Long checked with Exchange

Manager Gantz and gave Paige the telephone number of the local agent for

the Federal Labor Relations Authority. Apparently, neither Long nor

Gantz suggested that the grievance could be processed without Union

intervention. Paige thereafter contacted the local Authority agent and

filed the instant unfair labor practice charge on February 11, 1981,

prior to implementation of the reduction-in-force.



Around March 31, 1981, the reorganization of the gas station was

implemented. There is no evidence to suggest that any further grievance

was filed or that the employees sought further assistance of the Union

after the implementation. As a result of the reorganization, employee

Santiago submitted her resignation and was rehired in the laundry, in

the dry-cleaning plant; employee Gutowski exercised her retreat right

to a presser position in the laundry; employee Kamanu was hired as a

cashier/checker in the newly automated gas station; and, employee Paige

went on maternity leave beginning in April 1981, but ultimately returned

to a cashier/checker position at the newly automated station.



According to the Union's vice president Gregory Elliot, he was, as

previously noted, aware of the reduction-in-force in early January 1981

and at that time he contacted Exchange Manager Gantz regarding

negotiations. Gantz does not recall a specific contact, but assumes

there was some contact with the Union concerning the reorganization.

After the unfair labor practice charge was filed in early February 1981,

Elliot again contacted Gantz concerning the reduction-in-force because

he was concerned about possible financial liabilities of the Union.

Elliot states that he informed Gantz of his concern with respect to the

grade and pay retention and the way employees would be placed in the

PS-2 positions. According to Elliot, Gantz told him that it was a

reorganization and that was the way it was going to be handled. Elliot

allegedly argued that the matter should be handled as a reclassification

because of the change of duties, but Gantz responded that the Exchange

was not going to give them the benefit of grade and pay retention.

Gantz recalls that he had contact with the Union concerning the

reduction-in-force following the January 21, 1981 meeting, but does not

recollect the exact nature of these meetings. I credit Elliot in

finding that the Union indeed contacted Activity management, in both

January and February concerning the reduction-in-force, but was

unsuccessful in its attempts to negotiate concerning the matter.



Elliot also testified that his research on the matter revealed that

the only issue involved was whether the Activity's action was a

reorganization or a reclassification. Certainly this is a matter about

which the parties disagreed and the grievance machinery of the

collective bargaining agreement could have been brought into play to

resolve this difference in understanding. Nonetheless, Elliot states

that the issue of pay could not be handled under the grievance procedure

and that there were no regulations regarding what would happen to an

employee moving between pay schedules in non-appropriated fund

operations. Finally, Elliot testified that no grievance was filed

concerning the actual implementation of the reduction-in-force because

the Civil Service Reform Act provisions applied only to employees

covered under the crafts and trades pay schedule and do not apply to the

affected employees, and that the provisions of the Civil Service Reform

Act concerning a (non-appropriated) employee's entitlements to the same

pay cannot be addressed under a grievance procedure or under any appeals

procedure. /6/



Discussion and Conclusions



Section 7114(a)(1) of the Statute provides that a labor organization

is "responsible for representing the interests of all employees in the

unit it represents without discrimination and without regard to labor

organization membership." Furthermore, the doctrine that an exclusive

representative's statutory authority to represent all members of a

designated unit includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests

of all members of that unit without arbitration or discrimination, and

to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty to avoid

arbitrary conduct, has long been accepted by the Supreme Court. Vaca v.

Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).



The Union insists that the General Counsel has not produced any

evidence that it failed or refused to fulfill its obligation of fair

representation to the four employees herein. The Union argues that from

the time it first learned of the employer's planned reorganization, it

expended considerable effort, first investigating and then opposing the

proposed reduction-in-force. Further, it states that no grievance was

filed during January or February 1981 because the Agency was only

proposing to act and had not taken such action. After the

reduction-in-force was implemented, it decided not to file a grievance

or appeal because it concluded that there was no grievable or appealable

matter.



Although the grievance here may have been complex and time consuming,

that alone is not determinative of whether the Union breached its duty

of fair representation. The statutory obligation of an exclusive

representative to represent all members of a designated unit is breached

when conduct by the Union is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith,

Vaca v. Sipes, supra. The credited evidence discloses that Union

business representative told employees Paige, Gutowski, Santiago and

Kamanu on January 21, 1981 that the Union would represent them only if

they joined or "rejoined"; that these employees were given a five day

limit in which to join the Union; and that they were going to have to

pay money to obtain representation. Page, as the record revealed, is a

full-time business representative who also acted as a negotiator for the

present collective bargaining agreement. Page's own testimony and the

testimony of others indicated a degree of assertiveness in ordering

Smith from the January 21 meeting and in seeking overtime for the four

employees. Thus, if the Union had no obligation initially to assist

these employees, Page undertook the obligation to represent them. In

assuming this obligation, the Union assumed the concurrent obligation

not to act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way.



Certainly Page was interested in obtaining and maintaining union

membership for as she states, the Union "strives" on membership. The

conclusion is inescapable that Page used this opportunity to seek to

obtain additional membership for the Union. Therefore, full credit must

be given to the employees accounts, fragmented as they are, that Page

indeed solicited their membership before the Union would assist them in

this matter. Page's credibility is further strained by the action of

chief steward Mata who later refused to process the Paige grievance

because the employees were not Union members. Mata's refusal because

they had not joined the Union leaves little doubt about the Union's

motivation here. In all the circumstances, the only reasonable

inference to be drawn is that Page actively sought out Union membership

in exchange for assisting these employees, and when they refused to join

the Union halted any action by it on the reduction-in-force until after

an unfair labor practice charge was filed. Accordingly, it is found

that the General Counsel established by a preponderance of the evidence

that Page's attempt to require these employees to join the Union in

order to obtain Union assistance with their reduction-in-force was

discriminatory and in violation of section 7116(b)(1) and (8) of the

Statute.



With respect to the Mata incident, the credited corroborated evidence

is that the grievance filed by Paige was rejected by the Union and

returned to Paige for one reason, that these employees were not Union

members. It is settled law that a union need not process a frivolous

grievance. Vaca v. Sipes, supra. Finding a violation turns not on the

merits of the grievance, but rather on whether the Union's disposition

of the grievance was perfunctory or motivated by ill will or other

invidious considerations. A deliberate and unjustifiable refusal to

process a grievance for discriminatory reasons constitutes a violation

of the Statute. While the Union argues in mitigation that it was

engaged in investigation and made proposals concerning the

reduction-in-force, its investigation of the matter and attempts to

negotiate appear rather cursory prior to the filing of the instant

unfair labor practice charge.



Indeed, a labyrinth of regulations concerning reduction-in-force, pay

and grade retention exist. See, 5 C.F.R. 351, et al. Although the

matter was complicated, it apparently was not impossible to solve as

Union efforts after the unfair labor practice was filed clearly show.

Thus, the Union, if it handled the matter at all gave only a superficial

effort and without question rejected the grievance because these

employees were not members. An escalation of its handling of the matter

after the unfair labor practice was filed does not alter the fact that

the grievance was initially rejected for membership reasons.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that its attempts to resolve the

matter were ever conveyed to any of the affected employees, and they

were left with the impression that the only reason that their grievance

was not processed was because they were not Union members. Such action

by an exclusive representative in requiring membership in order to

accept and process a grievance of an employee in a unit which it

represents is discriminatory and interferes with, restrains and coerces

employees in violation of section 7116(b)(1) and (8) of the Statute.



With respect to the independent allegation that the Union unlawfully

solicited membership during work time, the Union does not deny that its

agents may have engaged in impermissible solicitations, but contends

only that, if so, the conduct was negligent and unintentional rather

than deliberate. It does, however, question whether the employees

herein were in duty status. The record disclosed that while two

employees had clocked out, two others were still on the clock and

working, and that they were indeed paid overtime at the Union's request

for participation in the meetings.



The General Counsel contends that section 7131(b)(7) precludes the

use of official time by a union for conducting internal union business

such as soliciting of membership. There is ample record evidence, as

noted above, to show that at least two of the affected employees were

not in a "non-duty" status since they were still on the clock and were

subsequently paid by the Activity for the time spent at the meeting. In

such circumstances, solicitation of these employees for Union membership

is prohibited by the Statute. Accordingly, it is found that the Union's

conduct in soliciting membership from employees in duty status is

prohibited by section 7131(b) and in violation of section 7116(b)(1) and

(8) of the Statute.



The Remedy



Having found that the Union did engage in conduct violative of

section 7116(b)(1) and (8) of the Statute it is recommended that it

cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative actions designed

to effectuate the policies of the Statute.



The question of back pay for breach of the duty of fair

representation by a union has never been considered by the Authority.

There is no doubt that the Authority is empowered under section

7105(g)(3) and 7118(a)(7) of the Statute to fashion such a remedy where

warranted.



The General Counsel argues that the egregious conduct engaged in by

the Union warrants a remedy requiring that the affected employees be

made whole for any pay lost as a result of the reduction-in-force

action, from the date of the reduction-in-force implementation to the

date the Union secures consideration of the grievance filed by those

employees, or that the employees affected obtain the position they would

have obtained had there been no violation by the Union. I disagree that

such a remedy is appropriate in this particular matter.



The Supreme Court set out the basic principle for apportionment of

damages for breach of fair representation in Vaca v. Sipes, supra, as

follows:



The governing principle then is to apportion liability between

the employer and the Union according to the damage caused by the

fault of each. Thus, damages attributable solely to the

employer's breach of contract should not be charged to the Union,

but increases if any in those damages caused by the Union's

refusal to process the grievance should not be charged to the

employer.



Thus, where there is a breach of fair representation, only the liability

for any intervening wage loss or losses which are not the result of an

employer's discrimination or breach would fall upon the union.



In proposing such a remedy the General Counsel no doubt seeks to

discourage illegal distinctions between members and non-members, but

ignores a basic formula running through all breach of fair

representation questions, that in order to establish legal damages, it

must be shown that the employee initially suffered from an improper

action from an employer's breach and that the Union could have secured

some relief. Even there, as here, a deliberate and unjustifiable

refusal to process a grievance is found, there remains a question of

entitlement, since damages are generally not warranted except where they

are to compensate for injury suffered. This record does not establish

the foregoing.



Contrary to the General Counsel's theory which assumes that the

matter grieved is meritorious, it is my view, that there must be a

substantial reason to believe that the Union's breach of its duty

contributed to any loss which is compensable. Assignment of fault for

liability prior to a determination of record that any liability exists

has several flaws. First, any damages for which the Union might be

responsible might well be de minimis. Secondly, there is no

indemnification for the Union, if after processing the grievance it

found to lack merit. Further, federal sector labor policy would not be

served by requiring a union to pay damages where the employee would not

be able to obtain the substantive relief sought by his or her grievance

or appeal. /8/ And, finally the Union's action herein did not prevent

these employees from either filing or pursuing a grievance or statutory

appeal, on their own, in a timely manner.



The instant record offers no clear and convincing evidence that a

grievance or appeal would have been successful or would have resulted in

any of these employees retaining pay or equivalent positions at their

level prior to the reduction-in-force. /9/ If anything, the record

establishes that the servicing of cars and collecting cash, performed by

these employees in the higher classification was no longer required in

the automated station. Under such circumstances, they may well not have

been entitled to retained pay or grade. Thus, the weight of the

evidence does not indicate that intervention by the Union would have

resulted in the substantive relief sought by the grievant Paige, i.e.,

same pay for same work, since the work appears from the record to be at

a lower classification and somewhat different. Nor does the evidence

indicate that negotiations with the Activity would have resulted in a

satisfactory resolution for these employees. If, however, negotiations

would satisfy its obligation, the Union contacted the Activity in early

January before the unfair labor practice charge was filed and sought

negotiations, but was rebuffed. Furthermore, as Respondent's

uncontroverted testimony disclosed, these employees, who are

non-appropriated fund employees, could well not be covered by any

grievance or appeal procedures which would require retention of pay or

grade in a reduction-in-force. For the Authority to grant such a remedy

without that determination having been made would be purely speculative.



Here the record establishes only that employees at the automated

station, after the reorganization, performed lesser work which may or

may not have required a reduction in pay and grade. It does not reveal,

nor is it alleged, that there was either discriminatory treatment of

these employees by the Activity during the reorganization or that there

was any mistake in the reduction-in-force. Such an issue should be

resolved either through the grievance machinery or through the statutory

appeals procedure, each of which the Union argues is unavailable. To

order back pay prior to that determination would be punitive.



Another difficulty with the General Counsel's proposed remedy, is

that it overlooks potential liability of the Agency concerning whether

or not the reduction-in-force was discriminatorily or mistakenly

conducted. The record does not reveal nor is it suggested by the

parties that the reduction-in-force was defective. If not, there is no

liability for damages since the fundamental purpose of such a remedy is

to compensate for injuries suffered as a result of a breach by the

employing agency and for whatever other losses these employees may have

suffered as a result of Union discrimination in failing to pursue the

grievance. It must be recognized that the decision to reorganize and to

perform the reduction-in-force was exclusively within the province of

management and that the Union on its own can neither reinstate these

four employees nor, since all time limits have expired, grieve or appeal

the matter unless the Activity or the government agency assigned to

police the matter now agrees to accept a grievance or appeal.

Notwithstanding the Union's wrongful conduct, the fact remains that any

compensable injury for which liability initially exists, would have to

result from discrimination or a mistake attributable to the employer's

conduct, not the Union. Therefore, a determination of what injury was

suffered must be made before the Union can be ordered to make any

payment of damages to these employees. In this regard, cases such as

Vaca v. Sipes, supra; Bowen v. United States Postal Service, et al.,

103 S.Ct. 588 (1983); Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25 (1970); Harrison

v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273, 1279 (1977), all agree that the Union

is responsible not for damages solely attributable to an employer's

breach, but only for increases in damages caused by its own breach.

Such damages include legal fees and intervening wage losses. This

record shows neither. The net result of the General Counsel's proposed

remedy then would be to require no determination of that liability, but

require payment of damages by the Union before any determination of

liability has been made regardless of whether there is a compensable

injury. Such a result is incongruous with the general principle that

the Union is responsible only for damages caused by its own breach since

no damages have been shown.



The Union alleges that this matter was not subject to the parties'

grievance machinery or to a statutory appeals procedures due to the

status of these non-appropriated fund employees. Indeed, a maze of

regulations exist concerning reductions in force and pay and grade

retention. In taking such a position it shows a bias or

predetermination which would bar it from further effectively processing

the matter, even if all time limitations had not expired. The

legislative history of the Statute indicates Congress' intent to include

reduction-in-force coverage under the negotiated grievance procedure,

absent the parties' exclusion of such coverage. See Legislative History

of Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, Title VII of the

Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, p. 730, 735, 769, November 19, 1979.

Contrary to the Union's position that these employees were covered

neither by the negotiated procedure or a statutory appeals procedure, it

is found that whether the Activity's action was a reorganization or

reclassification was indeed an area which might have been considered

under the negotiated procedure, and the Union's refusal once a grievance

was filed undermined any opportunity for resolution through that

machinery. Under the Union's theory that there is no statutory appeal

procedure or grievance available, these employees have no protection

against a discriminatory or mistaken reduction-in-force. As business

representative Page testified, the grievance procedure was available for

any employee dissatisfaction. Since the grievance machinery does not

preclude grievances concerning reorganizations, it is found that the

Union could have, at the very least, attempted to process the grievance

through the procedures agreed to by the parties.



Here the facts are sufficient to establish discrimination by the

Union which seriously undermined any effort by these employees to

successfully pursue the grievance or appeal, either on their own or with

Union assistance. /10/ The remaining question is, what relief is

available, if any, for these employee's claim that they have failed to

secure any relief. Having answered that their problem might well have

been resolved, if not remedied favorably to them, through the negotiated

grievance machinery, and that the matter might have been considered

under that machinery, it is recommended that the Authority, under the

broad remedial discretion of section 7118(a)(7)(D), order, in addition

to a cease and desist order and notice posting, that the Union provide,

at its expense legal representation, of the employee's choice, to assist

them in seeking to obtain waivers of time limits, both under the

negotiated grievance machinery and the statutory appeals procedure, if

necessary, so that they might process a grievance or appeal relating to

the March 31, 1981 reduction-in-force, and to provide further services

which would have been performed by the Union in assisting these

employees in the reduction-in-force matter, had it not acted

discriminatorily in refusing to assist in the reduction-in-force or to

process the Paige grievance. Finally, it is recommended that the

Authority retain jurisdiction over this matter in order to reconsider

the remedy and provide further appropriate remedial provisions should

they become necessary.



Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Authority adopt

the following: /11/



ORDER



Pursuant to section 7118(a)(7)(A) of the Federal Service

Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C.Section 7118(a)(7)(A), and

section 2423.29(b)(1) of the Rules and Regulations, 5 C.F.R.Section

2423.29(b)(1), the Authority hereby orders that Service Employees

International Union, Local 556, AFL-CIO, shall:



1. Cease and desist from:



(a) Conditioning representation under the parties' collective

bargaining agreement of non-members on their joining the Service

Employees International Union, Local 556, AFL-CIO.



(b) Telling employees in the bargaining unit that it will not

process grievances pursuant to the contractual grievance procedure

because of their nonmembership in the Union.



(c) Refusing to process grievances of bargaining unit employees

because they are not members of Service Employees International

Union, Local 556, AFL-CIO.



(d) Soliciting employees to join the Union while those

employees are on duty status.



(e) In any like or related manner, interfering with,

restraining, or coercing any employee in the exercise of the

rights guaranteed by the Federal Service Labor-Management

Relations Statute.



2. Take the following affirmative action designed and found

necessary to effectuate the policies of the Statute:



(a) Advise all employees in the bargaining unit that the

Service Employees International Union, Local 556, AFL-CIO, will

represent the interests of all employees in the unit without

discrimination and without regard to labor organization

membership.



(b) Upon request, provide employees Patsy K. Paige, Miriam

Gutowski, Marcela Santiago and Earl Kamanu with a legal

representative of their own choosing at the Union's expense, to

allow them to seek a waiver of time limits either under the

grievance machinery or a statutory appeals procedure so they might

seek to process their grievance or file a statutory appeal and to

provide further services which would have been provided by the

Union had it not acted discriminatorily.



(c) Post at the Activity, Navy Exchange, Pearl, United States

Naval Base, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, copies of the attached notice

marked "Appendix" on forms to be furnished by the Federal Labor

Relations Authority. Upon receipt of such forms, they shall be

signed by the President of the Union and shall be posted and

maintained by him for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in

conspicuous places, including all bulletin boards and other places

where notices are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be

taken by the Union to ensure that such notices are not altered,

defaced, or covered by any other material.



(d) Pursuant to 2423.30 of the Authority's Rules and

Regulations, notify the Regional Director, Region 8, Federal Labor

Relations Authority, in writing, within 30 days from the date of

this Order, as to what steps have been taken to comply herewith.



ELI NASH, JR.

Administrative Law Judge



Dated: February 28, 1983

Washington, D.C.







APPENDIX



NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES



PURSUANT TO A DECISION AND ORDER OF THE FEDERAL LABOR

RELATIONS

AUTHORITY AND IN ORDER TO EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF CHAPTER 71

OF TITLE

5 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT

RELATIONS

STATUTE WE HEREBY NOTIFY OUR EMPLOYEES THAT:



WE WILL NOT condition representation on nonmembers on their joining the

Service Employees International Union, Local 556, AFL-CIO. WE WILL NOT

tell employees in the bargaining unit that the Service employees

International Union, Local 556, AFL-CIO will not process grievances

pursuant to the contractual grievance procedure because of their

nonmembership in the Union. WE WILL NOT solicit employees to join

Service Employees International Union, Local 556, AFL-CIO while on duty

status. WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, interfere with,

restrain, or coerce any employees in the exercise of the rights

guaranteed by the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute.

WE WILL NOT refuse to process grievances of bargaining unit employees

because they are not members of Service Employees International Union,

Local 556, AFL-CIO. WE WILL advise all employees in the bargaining unit

that Service Employees International Union, Local 556, AFL-CIO, will

represent the interests of all employees in the unit without

discrimination and without regard to labor organization membership. WE

WILL, upon request, provide employees Patsy K. Paige, Miriam Gutowski,

Marcela Santiago and Earl Kamanu with a legal representative of their

own choosing, at the Union's expense, in order to allow them to seek

waiver of time limits either to process the grievance or under a

statutory appeals procedure and to provide them whatever services the

Union would have provided in this matter had it not acted

discriminatorily.

(Agency or Activity)



Dated: . . . By: (Signature) This Notice must remain posted for 60

consecutive days from the date of posting and must not be altered,

defaced or covered by any other material. If employees have any

questions concerning this Notice or compliance with any of its

provisions, they may communicate directly with the Regional Director of

the Federal Labor Relations Authority, Region 8, whose address is: 350

South Figueroa Street, 10th Floor, Los Angeles, California, 90071, and

whose telephone number is: (213) 798-3805.













--------------- FOOTNOTES$ ---------------





/1/ Section 7131(b) provides:



Sec. 7131. Official time



. . . .



(b) Any activities performed by any employee relating to the

internal business of a labor organization (including the

solicitation of membership . . .) shall be performed during the

time the employee is in a nonduty status.





/2/ See American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1778,

AFL-CIO, 10 FLRA 346, 351 (1982); American Federation of Government

Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2633 and Veterans , Administration, Regional

Office, Cleveland, Ohio, 2 FLRA 4, 8 (1979).





/3/ Article 19, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Reduction In

Force states, in pertinent part:



Section 1. This Article pertains only to regular employees.

Reduction in force shall be defined as an action taken by

Management to increase the efficiency, economy, or effectiveness

of operations, causing the release of an employee through either

separation, demotion, furlough for more than thirty (30) days, or

reassignment requiring displacement. Reduction in force also

occurs when the release of an employee is required due to lack of

work or funds, reorganization, reclassification due to change in

duties, or the need to make a place for a person exercising

reemployment or restoration rights, within the Navy Exchange,

Pearl Harbor.



Section 2. The Employer agrees that prior to giving Unit

members official notice of a proposed reduction in force, the

Union will be notified in advance of the proposed effective date,

the number of employees involved, and the types of positions to be

affected. The Union shall be provided an opportunity to express

its views and offer suggestions regarding the proposed

implementation. The Union agrees to render assistance in

communicating the reason(s) for the reduction in force to members

of the Unit who may be affected. The Union will have the

opportunity to be present at all formal meetings held for the

purpose of issuing reduction-in-force notices.





/4/ Page is a full-time business representative with two years

experience in that position. Page also participated as a union

negotiator and signed the present collective bargaining agreement

between the parties.





/5/ The parties collective bargaining agreement in Article 28,

Grievance Procedures, contains several pertinent provisions concerning

entitlement to representation, including:



Section 2 C.(2). Any claimed violation, misinterpretation, or

misapplication of any law, rule, or regulation affecting

conditions of employment.



Section 3. Complaints over the following shall not be

processed under this procedure.



(e) The classification of any position.



Section 5. Appeal and Grievance Options. An aggrieved

employee affected by discrimination may choose to raise the matter

under either a statutory appellate procedure or the negotiated

grievance procedure, but not both.



Section 7. An employee or a group of employees may present

grievances to appropriate management officials and have them

adjusted without the intervention of the exclusive representative.

. . .



And, the following concerning processing of a grievance:



Section 11. Step 1. The employee shall first submit the

grievance, in writing . . . within ten (10) calendar days after

the alleged violation. . . . The appropriate level of Union

representation at Step 1 shall be the designated Shop Steward. . .

. The Department Manager shall issue a written decision to the

employee not later than ten (10) calendar days after the receipt

of the grievance. . . .





/6/ With regard to this obligation, the United States Code might well

support this position. It states:



5 U.S.C. 5342(a)(2)(B) defines prevailing rate as:



an employee of a nonappropriated fund instrumentality described

by section 2105(c) of this title who is employed in a recognized

trade or craft, or other skilled mechanical craft, or in an

unskilled, semiskilled, or skilled manual labor occupation, and

any other individual, including a foreman and a supervisor, in a

position having trade, craft, or laboring experience and knowledge

as the paramount requirement. . .



5 U.S.C. 2105(c) states that nonappropriated fund employees are not

employees for the purpose of (1) laws (other than subchapter IV of

Chapter 53 and sections 5550 and 7154 of this title) administered by the

Office of Personnel Management.





/7/ Section 7131(b) of the Statute provides:



Any activities performed by any employee relating to the

internal business of a labor organization (including the

solicitation of membership, elections of labor organization

officials, and collection of dues) shall be performed during the

time the employee is in a non-duty status.





/8/ The Federal Labor Relations Council, found in Department of the

Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Yuma Project Office, Yuma, Arizona,

FLRC No. 74A-52, that the jurisdiction over certain employees appeals,

particularly a reduction-in-force involved in that case, fell within the

jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission and the determination of

whether employees were entitled to back pay was for exclusive

determination by the appeals procedure under section 19(d) of the

Executive Order and not the Assistant Secretary. The Council held that

an unfair labor practice complaint may not be used as an alternative

method for obtaining redress for the employees who properly have access

to the appeals procedure. There the Council's rejection seemingly is

based not on any reluctance to remedy the alleged violations, but

instead on finding itself without authority to grant such a remedy. The

Yuma case, however, does not preclude the Authority from granting a back

pay remedy here. The Statute, unlike the Executive Order contains broad

discretionary language for remedying unfair labor practices including

section 7117(a)(7)(D) which includes broad authority to take "such other

action as will carry out the purposes of this chapter". Thus, the

Authority is clearly vested with discretion to grant any reasonable

remedy where it deems such a remedy would effectuate the purposes of the

Statute.





/9/ The private sector cases cited by the General Counsel are

inapposite. Those cases involve matters where the employer plainly

disregarded clear-cut contract provisions without objection from the

exclusive representative and the employees were clearly entitled to make

whole remedies. The General Counsel maintains that uncertainty as to

the potential merit of the grievance should be resolved in favor of the

victims, not the wrongdoer, since it is the Union's wrongdoing that

created the uncertainty. This argument overlooks the fact that in this

case there may well be no wrongdoing for which compensation is due,

since there is a real question as to whether these employees are

entitled under government regulations to retain pay and grade. Further,

it overlooks a crucial element, that the reduction-in-force involved

here was never challenged as discriminatory or mistaken. Moreover,

while the National Labor Relations Board adopts the position that fault

must be assumed, it is not universally accepted. See, N.L.R.B. v. Local

485, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers,

AFL-CIO Automative Plating Co. 454 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.) where the Court

found such a remedy speculative and punitive. Compare Truck Drivers,

OCL Drivers, Local 705, 209 NLRB 292 (1974).





/10/ Although the Agency was not charged in this matter, it occurs

that it was at equal fault here in not advising these employees as to

exactly what their appeal rights were in this reduction-in-force. The

record reveals several opportunities for such action by the Activity,

including an opportunity to accept and process the initial grievance on

January 23, 1981 without Union intervention. The Activity must bear

some of the burden herein since its erroneous actions and advice at

least contributed to these employees not having a grievance processed to

resolution, whether satisfactory or unsatisfactory to them.





/11/ Based on the above, it is unnecessary to decide whether the

Union's liability should be limited, as argued at the hearing. Assuming

that a back pay remedy is appropriate however, I agree with the General

Counsel that the reschedulings of the matter for hearing were not

objected to by the Union nor was it alleged that these reschedulings

were in any way improper or that they would create a hardship for the

Union. In such circumstances, it is difficult to envision that the

reschedulings had any connection with limiting the Union's back pay

liability in this matter.















..



.



.



.

.



Ethics | FOIA | Inspector General | No FEAR Act & EEO | Privacy
When you are dead it's likely you won't know it. It could be difficult for others. It's the same if you are stupid.
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dieselengine9
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non paying and slow paying customers

Post by dieselengine9 » Mon Nov 17, 2014 1:49 am

That's way too many words.

ZMiller
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non paying and slow paying customers

Post by ZMiller » Mon Nov 17, 2014 2:50 am

Diesel I was curious as to how much data the GOOGLE server would hold. It's nice to know that the forum will hold a posting of your life story when the time comes.



By the way I found a union badge from a few years back signifying representation by the AFL/CIO for Meter Rebuilders and Device Repairman. I'm thinking as I'm sure you are as well that it's about time for a little industry organization.
When you are dead it's likely you won't know it. It could be difficult for others. It's the same if you are stupid.
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dieselengine9
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non paying and slow paying customers

Post by dieselengine9 » Mon Nov 17, 2014 3:53 am

I'm thinking what I'm usually thinking when you come up with an idea...

killlereye
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Re: non paying and slow paying customers

Post by killlereye » Tue Feb 10, 2015 1:05 am

5 U.S.C. 2105(c) states that nonappropriated fund employees are not

employees for the purpose of (1) laws (other than subchapter IV of

Chapter 53 and sections 5550 and 7154 of this title) administered by the

Office of Personnel Management.
Buy casino slot games online.

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Re: non paying and slow paying customers

Post by Samir » Mon Jun 15, 2015 9:39 pm

There's some crazy stuff in there in the snippets I read. It's a good read if you've read case law before.
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